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Abstract
Competition between private and public firms can increase service quality and
reduce public costs in markets for tax-financed welfare services with non-contractible
quality. Synergies arise from combining high-powered incentives for quality provision
(emanating from private firms) with low rents (public firms). However, sometimes,
the optimal regulation requires the government to provide public firms with better
funding than private competitors, e.g. by paying them higher prices or covering their
deficits. This additional compensation is not tied to any additional verifiable quality
obligations and may therefore violate competitive neutrality rules incorporated to
various areas of legislation.
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1 Introduction
Commercial companies can often not compete with government businesses on an equal
footing. The commercial media companies struggle to persuade viewers to pay for con-
tents as a result of the many programs provided for free by tax- and license fee-funded
public service broadcasting companies such as the BBC in the U.K. In recent times also
printed-media companies must struggle to compete with the websites hosted by public
service companies.1 In Australia, private educators are worried about differentiated pub-
lic funding of private and public schools and discriminatory risk assessments of private
providers of higher education.2 In Sweden, public entities and third sector organizations
have been exempted from taxes and charges in sports markets.3 Other controversial prac-
tices include absence of yield requirements, as well as explicit or implicit government
guarantees on debts, which may permit government businesses to operate at a loss and
with freedom from the threat of insolvency. A recent E.U. case concerned the practice by
the local authorities in Brussels to cover the systematic deficits of public hospitals, with-
out offering similar subsidies to the competing private hospitals in the region.4 Similarly,
members of the U.S. business community where concerned that, while the Trans-Pacific
Partnership was meant to level the playing field between state-owned enterprises and pri-
vate businesses, in a growing part of the world with many state owned titans, it only
applied to companies where a state (excluding local governments) controls 50 percent of
voting rights and also contained exemptions for state-run sovereign wealth funds.5
Worries about such unequal treatments and the possible market distortions that may
follow, raises the first question of this paper: Why should public entities and private
producers co-exist and compete in the same market? If there are no specific gains to
public-private competition, then the simplest solution is probably to reserve markets
exclusively for either public or private producers, thereby eliminating the issues of fair
competition all together. A case in point is the debate about the “public option” in
American health insurance markets. While the proponents hope that public companies
would both restore local competition and rectify that private companies deny coverage
for some people, the critiques fear that a public option would allow the government to
hide its inefficiencies and draw consumers away from private insurance, despite offering
an inferior product.6 As discussed below, it is possible find limited support for both sides
in the previous literature.
On the other hand, if there are specific gains to public-private competition, it is
important to understand what they might be. Only then can the second question of
1Dept. for Culture, Media and Sport (2015); European Publishers Council (2009).
2ACPET (2012); ISCA (2014).
3Förvaltningsrätten (2013).
4European Commission (2016).
5Lawson (2015).
6See e.g. Krugman (2009) and Mankiw (2009).
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this paper be asked: How should mixed markets be organized to secure the gains from
public-private competition? The key regulatory issue is often perceived to be competitive
neutrality: ensuring that government business activities compete on their merits and that
they do not enjoy a net competitive advantage simply by virtue of their public sector
ownership.7 Achieving such competitive neutrality has motivated adjustments to many
areas of public policy, including tax law, trade agreements, competition policy, public
procurement regulation, as well as guidelines for corporate governance of state-owned
entities.8 There is, however, not much research to guide how the idea of competitive
neutrality should be turned into law and practice.
The answers to these two questions are likely to vary from market to market and to
depend on the political goals of the government. Over the past decades there has been a
rise in the number of markets with mixed ownership.9 In some sectors, public firms start
to explore commercial opportunities, competing with existing private firms. The OECD
(2016) estimates that 22% of the world’s largest firms are now effectively under state
control and they are active in finance (banking and insurance), energy, communication
as well as in e.g. manufacturing. In the welfare sectors, it is the other way around.
These sectors are being opened up to greater provision by private firms and third sector
organizations in an attempt to reduce costs or increase quality. This paper focuses on
the latter only: tax-financed welfare services provided by local governments. Examples
may include child care, education, health care and long-term elderly care. The analysis
presumes that the local government acts as a representative citizen, aiming to provide
high quality for the users at a low cost for the tax-payers. Producer rents (both in the
form of profits or supra-competitive wages) are regarded as costs for the taxpayers.
Following the literature on incomplete contracts (discussed below), my model includes
two reasons why both markets and regulations fail to deliver the first best in the welfare
service sector. The most basic problem is that many important quality dimensions can
usually not be verified in a court of law. They are therefore not amenable for contract-
ing or regulation by the government. Examples include teachers and doctors exercising
considerable control over quality, e.g. through their choice of educational methods and
patient treatments. In many cases, however, the users have at least limited ability to
observe various aspects of non-verifiable quality even before the service is used. Families
may e.g. visit different schools before selecting one and they may learn from their friends’
previous experiences. Thus, while people traditionally where assigned to schools and hos-
pitals based on proximity, today they are often given the right to select their own supplier
of welfare services. The service providers then have to offer also non-verifiable quality
to attract customers. The second problem is that such quality competition is limited.
7Australian Governments (1996).
8European Union (2015); OECD (2015, 2016).
9Office of Fair Trading (2010).
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One reason is that welfare services are provided on local markets, making them natural
oligopolies. And the users choose among the local service providers not only based on
the quality they provide but also based on the exact location of their premises. Another
reason is that users typically find it difficult to compare the qualities offered by differ-
ent producers. Thus, as producers can only poach a share of the rivals’ customers by
offering superior quality, their incentives to do so are limited. In such an environment,
the allocation of decision rights matter. Here, it is assumed that the government can
choose to either administrate production directly or to contract it out to private firms.
With direct administration, the government sets production levels, provides the necessary
resources (which may include both appropriations and physical resources such as school
or hospital buildings suitable for the intended production volume), hires a manager and
sets a wage. The wage is will be fixed since output is already fixed. The managers decide
on their non-verifiable qualities, in competition with one another, to attract sufficiently
many users to fill their production targets. With contracting, the government only sets
the voucher price. In this case, the managers not only choose the non-verifiable qualities
but also how much to produce. Ownership is thus associated with the right to decide
on the production volume as well as the right to keep surpluses and the obligation to
cover deficits. As elaborated further below, the difference between public and private
ownership is also a difference in the “power of incentives” and a difference in “contractual
completeness.”
Main results The first main result is that a mix of public and private ownership can ease
the tension between incentives and rents and may lead to higher service quality and lower
public cost, compared to both private-only and public-only competition. If all producers
are public, they will provide low non-contractible quality. The reason is that the managers
have a common interest in any concerted reduction in quality that keeps volumes fixed
at the levels decided by the owner. The advantage of public ownership is that costs are
kept low (given any level of quality). It is sufficient for the government to pay the public
managers a fixed compensation, equal to the cost of effort. If all producers are private,
any level of quality can be induced. The reason is that a voucher system provides the
owners/managers with high-powered incentives to offer high quality to attract customers.
The drawback is that, if the government is confined to pay a fixed voucher price per
user, then the private producers must be allowed to earn a positive profit. It follows
that the choice between pure public ownership and pure private ownership is an instance
of the classical trade-off between incentives and rents. A mix of ownership may then
be preferred. In particular: when competing with private producers with high-powered
incentives, public entities must provide high quality to fill ambitious production plans
despite earning no rents. Overall costs are kept low since the public producers earn no
rents and since they capture large market shares as a result of their superior quality.
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But there is a caveat. The second main result is that the optimal regulation of a mixed
market may be construed as a deviation from the principle of competitive neutrality. The
government compensates the private producers with a price larger than their unit cost but
which is lower than the public competitor’s cost (which is higher as a result of a higher
quality). Thus, the public producer must either be allowed to run a deficit that the owner
covers with tax revenues, or the government must set the per-customer remuneration
higher for public producers. In either case, one may speak of a tax-financed subsidy,
which is available to public producers but not to their private rivals. The subsidy is
reminiscent of predatory pricing. It enables the public producers to provide a quality
that would cause a loss for an equally efficient private producer.
Therefore, I also examine the case when the (local) government’s activities are con-
strained by a competitive neutrality regulation. Such a regulation may be warranted for
reasons outside of the model considered here. Selective subsidies may e.g. be considered
unfair or reduce the public managers’ incentives to contain costs. As intuition suggests,
competitive neutrality regulation benefits the private firms. They will get higher voucher
prices, larger market shares and higher profits. But competitive neutrality regulation
also makes mixed ownership less attractive for the (local) government. My third main
result shows that this effect is particularly strong in case the users are immobile (due
to difficulties comparing quality or high transportation costs), in which case pure pub-
lic ownership is the second best alternative. Thus, the long run effect of a competitive
neutrality regulation may be that the government switches from mixed ownership to pure
public ownership. In the present model, there is never a switch to pure private ownership.
Clearly the model of this paper does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the costs
and benefits of neither mixed markets nor competitive neutrality regulation. Many im-
portant issues have been left out, including “cream skimming” and “peer effects” just to
mention a few. It follows that the above results should not be taken to prove that mixed
ownership should be the preferred ownership model in most markets, not even in most
welfare service markets, nor that competitive neutrality regulation would be harmful in
most mixed markets. The results do indicate, however, that there can be specific gains
to public-private competition (relaxing the tradeoff between incentives and rents) and
that competitive neutrality regulation may thwart these gains under some circumstances.
The results therefore suggest that competitive neutrality regulations might best be imple-
mented selectively. An example of such selective intervention is the European regulation
of “state aid.” These rules provide the Member States with considerable discretion with
regard to so-called services of general economic interest. However, a precondition for ex-
emption is that the selective compensation is limited to cover the extra costs borne by
producers with well-defined extra service obligations.10 In contrast, this paper provides
a rationale for public-private competition and subsidies to public entities exactly in the
10Altmark judgement of the European Court of Justice, C-280/00, 24.7.03.
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case when it is impossible to verify quality.
2 Related literature
A first first rationale for mixed markets is simply that public and private firms are different,
that the benefits of different ownership models may vary from sector to sector, and that
the best solution is unknown. Therefore, the two ownership models should compete to
provide the best solution in all sectors of the economy (Allais, 1948). This argument is,
however, weak regarding tax-financed welfare services, since users base their choices on
quality only and need not pay the price themselves. Later studies of mixed oligopoly
assume that the main difference between private and public firms is what goals they
pursue and how productive they are. One strand of the literature focuses on whether
a public producer can reduce the welfare losses due to market power in an otherwise
private oligopoly. The first papers argue that public producers may indeed fulfill such a
role, assuming that public managers set prices to maximize social welfare (see Crémer et
al., 1989 with references). Later studies provide less favorable results for mixed markets.
With free (but costly) entry, the presence of a welfare (or output) maximizing public
producer is irrelevant to overall welfare (Bennett and La Manna, 2012). Public producers
may reduce market efficiency by increasing total production costs (De Fraja and Delbono,
1989). Another strand of the literature (Sappington and Sidak, 2003a, 2003b) focus on
public firms’ incentives for predation. Also they argue that public firms typically are
instructed to pursue goals other than profit maximization. However, they emphasize
goals such as increasing local employment or to ensure that affordable service is provided
to low-income families. They also argue that managers (public or private) often are
intrinsically motivated to expand the scale or scope of their operations in part, because a
manager’s abilities may be inferred from the size of the operations that he or she oversees.
Public managers often have considerable discretion to pursue their own objectives. This
discretion arises in part because public firms are not subject to takeover threats and are
generally less subject to the discipline of capital markets than are private enterprises. As
a result of such goals and lack of discipline, public firms may have stronger incentives than
profit-maximizing firms to pursue activities that disadvantage competitors. The reason
is that such goals make public firms value an expanded operating scale. Thus, allowing
public producers to compete with private firms may cause inefficiencies.
A shortcoming of the previous studies of mixed markets is that they are not based on
the idea of optimal regulation subject to information constraints. In sharp contrast, the
literature on privatization (which, however, mostly focuses natural monopolies) has made
use of incomplete contract theory (see Schmidt, 1996, and Hart, Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). The present paper follows this tradition. It describes the government’s choice of
ownership as a choice of regulatory (or contractual) completeness. Either the government
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uses an “as-complete-as-possible regulation” including a specification of the production
levels or it uses a “more-incomplete-than-necessary regulation” delegating the right to
decide on quantity to the manager. The result that the government may prefer private
to public ownership is thus an instance of so-called strategic ambiguity. As noted by
Bernheim and Whinston (1998), once some aspects of performance (here: quality) are
unverifiable, it might be optimal to leave other verifiable aspects (here: quantity) of
performance unspecified. Wolinsky (1997) makes a related point in a context similar to
mine. He studies the relative merits of price-regulated monopolies and price-regulated
duopoly (called managed competition), when product quality is non-verifiable, using a
Hotelling model. The question is thus whether the government should allow the customers
to choose service provider (duopoly) or if it should assign exclusive territories (monopoly)
which in effect means that not only price but also quantity is regulated. The main
difference between my model and Wolinsiky’s is that in my model the producers have to
compete to fill their production plans, also when the government regulates each producer’s
total quantity. In addition, I can also consider the asymmetric case, when one producer
is under price regulation only and the other is under both price and quantity regulation.
A shortcoming of the present paper is that I simply equate ownership of a producer
with the right to decide on the firm’s output. An alternative interpretation of my model
is that the government keeps the ownership of both producers, but that it may delegate
authority over quantity to the managers and rely on performance (piece rate) pay. Thus,
the government could be described as simply choosing the power of incentives within the
public sector. It either uses variable pay (a.k.a. high-powered incentives) to induce effort
or fixed pay (a.k.a. low-powered incentives). Moreover, as Lazear (2000) notes, when a
firm (here: the government) uses a fixed wage schedule, it typically couples the payment
with some minimum level of output. Such a “new public management” interpretation pre-
sumes, however, that the owner actually can commit not interfere in the decision making
process. Moreover, when discussing the mixed regime, it seems less reasonable to interpret
private ownership as delegation within the organization. The reason is that employing
two different management styles in parallels within the same organization may cause both
confusion and opposition from the employees. Furthermore, despite the reforms during
the last decades, introducing elements of competition and performance measurement,
incentives are still mainly implicit, e.g. relying on individuals’ desire to attract users
rather than on financial rewards (see Grout and Stevens, 2003). For these reasons, I will
stick to the ownership interpretation throughout this paper. See Halonen-Akatwijuka and
Propper (2008) for a model explicitly designed to study the delegation of decision rights,
performance pay and competition, within the public sector.
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3 Model
Consider some tax-financed welfare service, provided to the citizens free of charge by the
(local) government. There are two producers, denoted by i = 1, 2. Each producer selects
its own level of non-verifiable quality, denoted by zi ≥ 0.11 There is a unit mass of users
and everyone is asking for one unit of service. Before selecting a service provider, an
individual user perceives a difference in quality if, and only if, this difference is larger
than some threshold value, |zi − zj| ≥ θ. This threshold varies in the population. While
some people are able to detect also small differences in quality, other people may not
even detect quite substantial differences. In particular, it is assumed that θ is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, t], where t > 0. Thus if 0 ≤ zi − zj ≤ t, the share s = zi−zjt
of the population observes which service provider has the highest quality. The informed
users will all select that producer. The uninformed users choose a service provider at
random, with equal probabilities.12 Thus, the residual demand for the producer with
higher quality is given by qi = 12 · (1− s) + s = 12 · (1 + s). The producer with lower
quality receives only qj = 12 · (1− s) customers. Thus:
Lemma 1. The residual demand for producer i is given by
qi =
1
2
+
zi − zj
2 · t (1)
if the difference in quality is not too large (|zi − zj| ≤ t). Otherwise the producer with
higher quality serves the whole market.
Note that equation 1 is simply the standard Hotelling demand model, but here used
to model the users limited perception of quality differences. It follows that t can be
interpreted either as the usual Hotelling transport cost, or as the highest perception
threshold in the population. In either case, t captures some reason why competition may
be limited, viz. geographical immobility or a limitation on the users’ ability to gauge
quality.
The government’s valuation of (willingness to pay for) a unit of producer i ’s service is
v0 + v · zi,
where v0 is the value of a service with contractible quality only and where v > 0 is
the value of a unit of non-contractible quality. Note that these are the government’s
valuations and that they may differ from, and typically will be greater than, the users’
11The assumption that the managers must decide on quality could alternatively be interpreted as a
situation where managers would be left with real authority over quality, also in case formal authority
resides with the government e.g. because it would be too costly for the government to gather sufficient
information over overrule the managers’ recommendations (cf. Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
12It is assumed that the uninformed users do not use market share or ownership as a signal of quality.
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own valuations.13 14
Production also requires resources. The higher is the quality produced, the higher
these production costs are likely to be. In particular, I assume that the producers’ pro-
duction cost per unit of output is increasing in non-contractible quality and given by
c0 + c · zi,
where c0 is the cost associated with the provision of contractible quality and c · zi is the
cost associated with non-contractible quality, including the manager’s efforts. For the
moment, it is assumed that this cost is not contractible.
Producers often have intrinsic preferences for offering high quality to their customers.
Such preferences may be particularly important when it comes to the provision of services,
where producers and customers actually meet in person. And they may be even more
pronounced when it comes to welfare services such as education and health care, which
are of great importance to the users. I assume that a manager’s own intrinsic valuation of
providing high quality services to the customers is given by b ·zi ·qi. However, to study the
critical issues, I will focus on such dimensions of quality that are not voluntarily offered
by the producers, i.e. the net private cost of offering quality is positive, c − b > 0. I
also focus on the case when the value of quality is higher than the net private cost of
producing it, v > c− b. I also assume that if a monetary compensation “crowds out” part
of intrinsic motivation, then the effect is the same in case of a fixed compensation and
incentive pay. That is, b is independent of ownership.
The timing is as follows.
Figure 1: Timeline
First, the government uses its regulatory powers to decide on the ownership structure.
13In fact, the reason why welfare services in many countries are financed through taxes and provided
to the users free of charge is often that the government has a higher willingness to pay. This difference
may e.g. arise from positive externalities, specific egalitarianism (i.e. the wish to make the certain goods
available to all citizens independent of their ability to pay (Tobin, 1970)), or that the services are so-
called merit goods (i.e. goods that yield long-term private benefits that the users tend to undervalue
(Ng, 1983)), or a combination of these reasons.
14A condition for a voucher system to fulfill the political goals is that the users value the same qualities
as the government (think of grade inflation in schools) and that the threat of over-use (which is a risk in
health care) can be controlled. I will neglect these problems here and instead focus on another problem,
namely the lack of competition.
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The producers may all be publicly owned, privately owned or a mixture of both.15 Sec-
ond, the government sets the voucher price p, which must be the same for all producers
independent of ownership.16 The government also sets the compensation schedule (wage
and production plan) for public managers. Third, the managers simultaneously decide on
their qualities. Finally, the users select service providers, based on their qualities.
3.1 First best
The local government acts as a representative citizen in their capacities as users of welfare
services and taxpayers. Producer rents in the form of profits or supra-competitive wages
are only considered as costs for the taxpayers. The reason may be that the firms are owned
by people outside the municipality, that producer rents conflict with the government’s
concerns for distribution, or that such rents reduce the probability of reelection. The
government’s objective function, also to be called the social welfare function, has three
components. To reduce clutter, I set v0 = c0 = 0. The social benefits is the sum of the
value of all services, B =
∑
i v · zi · qi. If the government’s expenditures are E, the social
cost is C = E + λ
2
·E2 where λ > 0. The reason why social cost is convex in expenditures
is that the expenditures for social services such as education and health care are large
enough to affect the tax rate and thus the cost of public funds.17 Finally the government
may care about equity. That is, the government may wish to avoid situations where
some citizens, as a result of their geographical location or their inability to spot quality
differences, use welfare services of lower quality than other citizens. The government’s
disutility from inequity is given by −α · I where α ≥ 0 is the strength of the government’s
inequity aversion and I = 1
2
· [(zi − zj) + 1t · (zi − zj)2] is a quadratic function of the
difference in quality, zi − zj > 0.18 The government’s objective function (social welfare)
is thus given by
W = B −
[
E +
λ
2
· E2
]
− α · I.
Before studying the different ownership arrangements, it is instructive to compute the
first best as a benchmark. The first best would be achieved if the government could chose
the two producers’ qualities directly and simply pay the corresponding net private cost of
production, i.e. E =
∑
i (c− b) · zi · qi.
Lemma 2. If the government could decide on non-contractible quality directly, it would
15I focus on public entities and private for-profit firms, leaving third sector organizations out for now.
16Providers of tax-financed services cannot be allowed to set their own prices since the users have no
reason to search for cheaper deals. Some form of price regulation, such as a voucher system, is needed.
17This assumption is made in order to “convexify” the government’s optimization problem. An alter-
native strategy would have been to assume that the cost of producing quality is strictly convex or that
the value of increased quality is strictly concave. The chosen strategy produces less clutter.
18The factor 1t multiplying the quadratic term is included for algebraic convenience. The inequity term
could alternatively be written as −α · I = −α · (zi − zj) · qi.
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set the same quality
z∗ =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 > 0,
for both producers and social welfare would be
W ∗ =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
> 0.
Proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The first best, thus, requires the producers to
provide positive levels of non-contractible quality.
4 Public vs. private ownership
Before studying mixed ownership it is instructive to compare pure public and pure private
ownership, as this has been the main focus of the previous literature.
4.1 Public ownership
I will start with pure public ownership since there is far less analysis of competition
between public entities than private firms. In the present paper public ownership is char-
acterized by the following assumptions. First, it is the (local) government that decides
how many services that each entity should produce. Traditionally, people where assigned
to schools and hospitals based on proximity. Today users are allowed more choice and the
providers must compete for users to deliver the number of services expected from them. It
is this competition that is the focus of this section. Second, the government also provides
the resources for filling the plans. Traditionally, most resources where provided in-kind.
Common examples include school and hospital buildings with dimensions embodying the
production plan. Politicians even decided on staffing levels of these schools and hospitals.
Today it is more common that local governments allow their managers more autonomy
by providing appropriations to cover the necessary costs. (This difference has little conse-
quence in the current model, since I assume that the government has perfect information
about the cost function.) Third, the government hires a manager for each service provider
and sets their wages. The wages are fixed since output is decided by the government and
quality is not contractible. In fact, financial incentives still appears to be of relatively
small importance in the public sector (Grout and Stevens, 2003).
Quality competition While the government cannot instruct a public manager to pro-
vide a certain level of quality, it has some ability to influence the managers’ choice of
quality indirectly by setting the appropriate production plans. Let q
i
≥ 0 denote the
required production level for producer i. (For the production plans to be meaningful it
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is required that both producers could fill their plans at the same time, i.e. q
1
+ q
2
≤ 1.
Without loss of generality, producers are numbered such that q
2
≥ q
1
.) If a public entity
succeeds to fill its plan, qi (zi, zj) ≥ qi, the manager receives the compensation wi and en-
joys utility ui (zi, zj) = wi− (c− b) ·zi · qi (zi, zj), where qi (zi, zj) = 12 + zi−zj2·t describes the
users’ choices of service provider.19 If not, the manager is swiftly replaced by somebody
else. The manager then receives the reservation utility, normalized to zero. The manager
will thus choose either to supply no effort at all or the minimum effort for reaching the
required production level, which is given by
Zi (zj) = max
{
2 · t ·
(
q
i
− 1
2
)
+ zj, 0
}
.
Conforming with the production plan is then a best reply if the wage is higher than the
necessary net effort cost, i.e. wi ≥ (c− b) · Zi (zj) · qi.20 Thus, a public manager will
produce a higher quality, the higher quality produced by the other producer and the
higher the required production level is.
A few minor clarifications are warranted. First, notice that the manager’s compensa-
tion is not contingent on output in any other way than to reflect whether the government’s
production target has been reached. This provides the manager with the maximum incen-
tives to fill the plan (but not necessarily to provide quality). Second, there are two versions
of the incomplete contracting problem. Either the government cannot observe quality or
it cannot fire a public manager based on a too low (observable but) non-verifiable quality.
Third, notice that if one of the public managers does not meet the required production
level, the demand for the other public entity’s services could exceed its required produc-
tion level (which would require that the second producer receives more resources). This
will not happen in equilibrium. It will also not happen out of equilibrium since the failing
manager is swiftly replaced.
As it turns out, we may confine attention to production plans that sum to one (q
1
+q
2
=
1) without loss of generality.21
Lemma 3. If q
1
+ q
2
= 1, any (z1, z2) with z1 ≥ 0 and z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+ z1 is a Nash
equilibrium, given that the wages cover the managers’ net costs, i.e wi ≥ (c− b) · zi · qi.
19I disregard the fact that production plans may sometimes also not be exceeded. Rationing is e.g.
common in higher education.
20More precisely, if zi ≥ Zi (zj), the manager stays on the job during the full period and receives
utility wi − (c− b) · Zi (zj) · qi. If zi = 0, the manager receives utility wi · 4 where 4 is the share of
the time left until being replaced. The manager exerts the minimum necessary effort if wi ≥ (1−4)−1 ·
(c− b) · Zi (zj) · qi. If 4 ≈ 0, the necessary “bonus” is negligible. And to reduce clutter, I omit it in the
calculations. If the manager is replaced, the new manager faces exactly the same tradeoff since 4 is the
share of the time left.
21The reason is that this restriction does not reduce the set of outcomes that the government can
induce. However, the full set of Nash equilibria, including the case q
1
+ q
2
< 1, can be found in Lemma
9 in the Appendix, together with all proofs.
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Notice that by setting q
1
= q
2
= 1
2
any z1 = z2 is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, if the
government has the ability coordinate the managers’ equilibrium expectations, it could
implement any qualities without leaving the managers with any rents. That is, the gov-
ernment could implement the first best. However, such an outcome would be vulnerable
to coordinated deviations from the two managers. To select a reasonable equilibrium, one
may use the notion of coalition proof equilibrium. Recall that in a game with two players,
an equilibrium is coalition proof only if there does not exist any other Nash equilibrium
which both prefer. Thus:
Lemma 4. If q
1
+ q
2
= 1, then z1 = 0 and z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
≤ t is the unique coalition
proof equilibrium.
The argument is straight forward. If z1 > 0, the two managers could agree to simultane-
ously reduce the two qualities by the same amounts without any loss of wage. Thus only
z1 = 0 is coalition proof.22
It should be noted that there is nothing generic about the number 1
2
in the Lemma.
It is simply the natural customer base of the producer, i.e. the producer’s market share
when both producers offer the same quality (z1 = z2). If one producer is better located
than the other, its natural customer base would be larger, say 3
4
. Inducing such a better
located producer to produce a higher quality than the competitor would require setting
that firm’s production plan higher than its natural customer base, i.e. higher than 3
4
.
Corollary 1. When both producers are publicly owned, the government can only induce
quality above the contractible level by requiring one producer to attract customers beyond
its natural customer base implying that the citizens get access to unequal levels of quality.
A possible example of such a public policy with asymmetric quality is the Swedish higher
education system, which is essentially populated by public universities only. Some of these
universities receive better funding and are supposed to provide a higher quality education
than other “regional” universities. It appears likely that the bigger universities preferential
treatment is contingent on their ability to recruit students from the whole country and
not just their surrounding areas.
Government policy Before the two public entities start to compete, the government
designs an incentive structure, by setting the production plans and wages, to maximize
social welfare. To describe government’s choice, let tG = v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 and α
G = v + b− c.
Lemma 5. If the government is very concerned with equality (α ≥ αG), it sets q
2
=
1
2
. Then both producers provide zero non-verifiable quality. If the government is less
22The result that public managers provide zero non-verifiable quality (when q
i
= 12 ) is due to the
assumption that their private benefits from providing quality (intrinsic motivation) is described by the
term b · zi · qi. If the model would include a term such as bz · zi or bdz · (zi − zj) or bq · qi (since qi is a
public signal of quality), the coalition proof equilibrium would entail positive levels.
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concerned with equality, it sets q
2
= 1
4
+
√
1
16
+ v+b−c−α
2·t·λ·(c−b)2 ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
if competition is lax
( t > tG) and q
2
= 1 if competition is intense. In equilibrium, social welfare is given by
WG =

0 α ≥ αG,
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
> 0, α < αG, t > tG,[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t] · t > 0, α < αG, t ≤ tG.
An unexpected consequence of the Lemma is that WG is increasing in t. In words:
Corollary 2. When both producers are publicly owned, social welfare is increasing in the
users’ immobility (geographical immobility or their inability to perceive quality differences).
To obtain intuition for this result, one should inspect the best reply function for the
manager with the ambitious production plan (q
i
> 1
2
). The less mobile the users are,
the higher quality the manager must offer to reach the production plan. This result even
suggests that under a system of pure public ownership, the government may not wish
to make non-verifiable information about quality differences between service providers
public.
4.2 Private ownership
Private firms select quality to maximize their profits.23 The profit of producer i is given by
pii = (p− (c− b) · zi)·
(
1
2
+
zi−zj
2·t
)
and it’s best-reply function is zi = max
{
p−t·(c−b)
2·(c−b) +
1
2
· zj, 0
}
.
Qualities are thus strategic complements also under private ownership: the higher quality
produced by one producer, the higher quality the competitor wishes to provide.
Lemma 6. When both producers are privately owned, they produce the same quality, given
by zP = max
{
p
c−b − t, 0
}
. The equilibrium profit is given by piP = (c−b)·t
2
, which is strictly
positive whenever quality is strictly positive.
Notice that the government can induce the private firms to produce whatever quality it
desires, by setting a sufficiently high price tag. To implement z > 0, the government must
set p = (c− b) · z+(c− b) · t where (c− b) · z is the marginal and average net private cost
of producing one unit of service and (c− b) · t is a necessary information rent.
As in the standard Hoteling model, private competition is less efficient the higher the
users’ transportation cost are. The producers’ thus earn higher rents the less mobile the
users are. A more surprising part of the result is that:
Corollary 3. When both producers are privately owned, the equilibrium producer rents
(profit) are higher the higher is the (net) private cost of quality, c− b.
23I use the term “profit” despite including the private benefits of quality.
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To obtain some intuition, notice that by the Envelope Theorem, cost has two effects on
equilibrium profits (at a given voucher price). Increasing the cost of quality clearly has a
negative direct effect on profits. But there is also a positive indirect effect: a higher cost
of quality implies that the competitor produces a lower quality, which increases a firm’s
residual demand. As it turns out, the positive indirect effect dominates the negative direct
effect.
Before the producers start to compete, the government sets the voucher price to max-
imize welfare. To describe the government’s choice, let tP ≡ v+b−c
2·v · v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 < v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 .
Lemma 7. The government sets a positive voucher price p = v+b−c
λ·(c−b) > t · (c− b) >
0, implying positive non-contractible quality, if users are sufficiently mobile (t ≤ tP ).
Otherwise the voucher price and non-contractible qualities are set to zero. Social welfare
is given by:
W P =
{
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c
c−b
]2 − v · t > 0, t ≤ tP ,
0, otherwise.
When the users are mobile (t ≤ tP ), the government induces a quality that is lower than
the first best and it leaves the producers with a rent. The reason why the government does
not offer a positive voucher price when the users are immobile is that quality competition
is rather ineffective in that case. Finally, for future reference, note that:
Corollary 4. When both producers are privately owned, the optimal voucher price is
higher, the higher is the governments valuation of quality (v). As a result, both producers
increase their qualities.
4.3 Pure private vs. pure public ownership
I will say that a certain property A is more likely than another property B if the subset
of the parameter space where A is true contains the subset in which B is true. Similarly,
I will say that a higher v makes property A more likely if a higher v enlarges the subset
of the parameter space in which A is true.
The following proposition characterizes the government’s preferences over (pure) pri-
vate and public ownership, when a mixed ownership model is not feasible.
Proposition 1. The government is more likely to prefer private ownership to public
ownership the more mobile the users are (lower t), and the more averse the government is
to inequality (higher α). If users are sufficiently mobile (t ≤ tP ) and inequality-aversion
is sufficiently low (α ≤ αG), the government is more likely to prefer private ownership to
public ownership the higher the government’s own valuation of quality (v) is, the lower the
effort cost of quality (c) is, and the higher the managers’ intrinsic motivation to provide
quality (b) is.
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Figure 2: Pure private vs pure public ownership
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The first part of the proposition is also illustrated in figure 2.
The reason why inequality aversion reduces the attractiveness of pure public ownership
is that the government can only induce quality above the contractible level by requiring
one producer to attract customers beyond its natural customer base thereby accepting
that the citizens get access to unequal levels of quality (Corollary 1).
The reason why a low ability to observe quality differences and low geographical user
mobility (i.e. a high t) increases the relative strength of pure public ownership is that a
high t both weakens quality competition between private producers and actually (Corol-
lary 2) improves quality provision when both producers are public.
The reason why a government with a high valuation of non-verifiable quality is more
likely to prefer pure private ownership is that the government then can set a high voucher
price and induce both producers to provide high quality (Corollary 4). With public
ownership at least one producer provides zero quality, independent of its value.
The role of the net private cost of quality (c − b) is less obvious, since a higher cost
reduces welfare with both types of ownership. But part of the reason why a high net cost
of quality increases the relative strength of public ownership is that the government must
leave private producers with higher rents, the higher is their net cost of quality (Corollary
3).
5 Mixed ownership
Consider now the case when one producer is private and the other is public. The two
producers’ best reply functions are the same as above. Given any government policy (p,
q
2
, w2), with a sufficiently high wage, there is a unique equilibrium in the quality compe-
tition game. The details of the equilibrium are described by Lemma 11 in the Appendix.
Here, I will simply compare this outcome with quality competition under pure public and
pure private ownership. The first Corollary demonstrates that all outcomes that can be
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achieved under pure public ownership can be replicated under mixed ownership.
Corollary 5. If the government does not offer the private firm any margins above the
cost of providing verifiable quality, i.e. p = 0, the private producer does not supply any
non-verifiable quality. Then, the public producer supplies the same non-verifiable quality
as the high-quality producer under pure public ownership, that is z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
.
The second Corollary demonstrates that the government can replicate any outcome under
pure private ownership.
Corollary 6. If the public producer is ordered to serve half the market, q
2
= 1
2
, the
public producer will simply match the quality offered by the private producer. As a result,
both producers will produce the same quality as under pure private ownership, that is
z = max
{
p
c−b − t, 0
}
.
A difference is that the public firm’s surplus is recouped by the government. Inducing high
quality is therefore cheaper under mixed ownership than under pure private ownership.24
The final Corollary demonstrates that the government also can achieve other outcomes
than under pure public and pure private competition:
Corollary 7. Increasing the voucher price above the cost of contractible quality (p > 0)
increases the private firm’s willingness to conquer market shares, and also forces the public
producer to respond. In fact, the public producer has to increase its quality by the same
amount as the private producer, to be able to defend its assigned market share. Increasing
the production plan for the public producer (above q
2
= 1
2
) increases the public firm’s
quality and indirectly also the private firm’s quality (if p > 0). However, the private
producer increases its quality by a smaller amount than the public producer. Thus, by
increasing the public firm’s production plan beyond a half, inequality is increased.
Thus, under mixed ownership, the government can either increase the private firm’s
voucher price or the the public firm’s production plan to induce both producers to supply
higher non-verifiable quality. Since a higher voucher price leaves the private firm with
higher rents and a more ambitious production plan for the public firm increases inequality,
the government has to balance these negative effects.
Government policy The government’s optimal policy is described by the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider mixed ownership. The government offers a voucher price above
the cost of providing contractible quality (i.e. p > 0) to give the private producer high-
powered incentives to conquer market shares by offering positive non-contractible quality if,
24Thus, mixed ownership is a partial remedy to the government’s inability to complement the voucher
system with fixed fees (see below) under pure private ownership.
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and only if, the users are sufficiently mobile. The government assigns an ambitious market
share for the public producer to defend (q
2
> 1
2
), inducing it to produce an even higher
non-contractible quality despite its low-powered incentives if, and only if, it is modestly
inequality avert.
The proof, which is relegated to the Appendix, demonstrates that there exists a continuous
function t∗ (α) such that (generically) p > 0 if t ≤ t∗ (α). The condition for q
2
> 1
2
is
α < 2 · v if t ≤ t∗ (α) and α < v + b− c otherwise.
One may think of the government as designing a “Conquest & Defense Game” be-
tween the private and the public producer with the purpose to elevate the level of non-
contractible quality.
Choice of ownership structure When there is pure public ownership, the government
can influence the producers’ choices of qualities with one independent instrument, namely
the production target q
2
. Also, when there is pure private ownership, the government has
one instrument, namely the price p. With mixed ownership, the government can use both
these instruments. Thus, the first main result of this paper is that:
Proposition 3. Mixed ownership (weakly) dominates both pure private and pure public
ownership. In particular,
• Social welfare is higher under mixed ownership than under pure public ownership if
users are sufficiently mobile (t ≤ t∗ (α)). The difference is that the government can
use p > 0 to induce higher quality from both producers, without causing inequality.
Otherwise the two ownership modes yield the same welfare.
• Social welfare is higher under mixed ownership than under pure private ownership
if the government’s inequality aversion is sufficiently mild (α < v + b − c) or if
users are sufficiently mobile (t ≤ t∗ (α)). The difference is that the government
can use q
2
> 1
2
to induce higher quality from both producers, at lower cost for the
tax-payers. Otherwise the two ownership modes yield the same welfare.
The essence of the proof is a straight-forward replication argument. By setting p = 0, the
government can implement the same (q
2
, z)-combinations as under pure public ownership
(Corollary 5). Thus, whenever the government sets p > 0, mixed ownership must be
preferred. By setting q
2
= 1
2
, the government can implement the same (p, z)-combinations
as under private ownership (Corollary 6). Thus, whenever the government sets q
2
> 1
2
,
mixed ownership must be preferred. And even when the same (p, z)-combinations are
implemented, this is cheaper under mixed ownership, since only one producer keeps the
rent.
The welfare levels under the different ownership regimes are also described by figure
3 for the case when the government’s inequality aversion is modest (α < v + b− c).
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Figure 3: Welfare under different ownership structures
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It is instructive to consider the case when unequal qualities is not perceived as a
problem (i.e. α ≈ 0). Then, the mixed market comes close to first best. In particular, the
public producer can be induced to produce a quality close to the first best quality and to
serve most of the market. The rents paid to the private producer are consequently small.
But even if the private producer would serve only a trivial fraction of the population, i.e.
even if q1 = 34 · αv+α ≈ 0, the presence of the private producer is necessary to discipline the
public producer to provide high quality services to everyone else. An agreement between
the managers to lower quality, keeping market shares fixed, would not be self-enforcing
as a private producer always has an interest in poaching customers from the its rival,
regardless of market shares. (The private producer is then used in a manner similar to a
pace setter - a “rabbit” - in a track race. It is not supposed to win, but it is necessary to
get the others going.)
Competitive neutrality To maximize social welfare under mixed ownership, the gov-
ernment induces the public producer to produce a higher quality than the private pro-
ducer (unless inequality aversion is very high). The public producer consequently also
has a larger market share than the private producer. Clearly, the government must offer
a voucher price that is high enough to cover the private firm’s cost. But, to leave the
private producer with the lowest possible rents, the voucher price is sometimes set lower
than the cost of the public competitor. Thus, a public producer given the same voucher
price as the private producer must be allowed to run a deficit that the owner covers with
tax revenues. An alternative is that the government sets the per-customer remuneration
higher for the public producer than for the private producer. In either case, one may
speak of a tax-financed subsidy, which is available to public producers but not to their
private rivals. The second main result of the paper is:
Proposition 4. To maximize social welfare under mixed ownership, either the public
producer must be allowed to run a deficit or the compensation must be set higher for the
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public producer than for the private producer (assuming that t < t∗ (α) and α < v
2
or
t ≥ t∗ (α) and α < (v + b− c)− 3
8
· t · λ · (c− b)2).
Such a subsidy may be construed as deviation from the principle of competitive neutrality.
The suggested scheme even resembles predatory pricing.
Corollary 8. The public producer provides a quality, so high that the costs cannot be
covered by the revenues from the market (under the same conditions as in Proposition 4).
Any equally efficient private producer providing the same quality would consequently make
a loss and would be forced into bankruptcy.
A possible example of such public “predatory quality” is the the public service broadcasting
companies such as the BBC and SVT/SR in Sweden.
6 Competitive neutrality regulation
Subsidies to public producers are more problematic than described above. I have neglected
the potential problems associated with so-called soft budget constraints (see e.g. Meg-
ginson and Jeffry, 2001). I have also neglected that subsidized public producers may be
expected to engage in predatory pricing, even squeezing private rivals out of the market,
under some circumstances (Sappington and Sidak, 2003a and 2003b).
Thus, to reap the full benefits of public-private competition, it might be necessary to
decide on the legality of subsidies on a case-by-case basis (cf. De Fraja, 2009). However,
such a flexible approach to competitive neutrality may not be feasible due to information
problems. Then, it may be necessary to implement competitive neutrality regulation also
in the market analyzed above.
I should also point out that my previous analysis builds on the assumption that com-
petitive neutrality is primarily a means for promoting efficiency and less of a goal of
procedural fairness in it self. That is, competitive neutrality is not meant to protect pri-
vate producers at the expense of the interests of the users or to upset broader political
goals for social welfare and equity.25 In contrast, private competitors often argue that
public subsidies only available to public producers are unfair and unwarrantable for that
reason.
Thus, for both reasons of efficiency and procedural fairness, it is important to study
what consequences a prohibition of subsidies to public entities in competition with private
producers would have in the current model. Any negative consequences would have to be
counted as a cost of such a regulation.
25Such an interpretation is supported by the policy statement on competitive neutrality by the Gov-
ernment of Western Australia (1996), the Swedish Competition Act (paragraph 27) and the fact that EU
state aid rules on services of general economic interest allow Member States to grant compensation for
the fulfillment of clearly defined public service obligations under certain conditions.
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A competitive neutrality regulation requires that p ≥ (c− b) · z2 to ensure that the
private producer receives the same remuneration per unit of output as the public producer.
(Setting p > (c− b) · z2 is not a problem since, then, the government simply collects the
surplus created within the public producer as a profit.)
Note that if the competitive neutrality restriction binds when t ≥ t∗ (α), the govern-
ment prefers to switch from mixed to public ownership. The reason is that the government
is indifferent between the two ownership models absent the competitive neutrality restric-
tion. Thus, I will only consider the case when t < t∗ (α).
Lemma 8. Assume that t < t∗ (α) and that one producer is publicly owned and the other
privately owned. A competitive neutrality regulation is binding if, and only if, α < v
2
.
When a binding competitive neutrality regulation is imposed, the government increases
the voucher price and lowers the production plan for the public producer. As a result, the
private firm’s profit is increased. Social welfare is then given by
WCN =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− v + 3 · α
8
· t.
However, under a “constitutional ban” on public subsidies of public producers in compe-
tition with private producers, the government would clearly be less inclined to promote
mixed markets, and rather select one of the two pure-ownership models.
Proposition 5. Under a binding competitive neutrality regulation, the government prefers
pure public ownership to mixed ownership if the users are sufficiently immobile (and α <
αG).
The proof of the proposition follows from a simple comparison of the welfare levels under
the different regimes, as in figure 4.
Figure 4: Welfare under different ownership structures
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The key point is that a competitive neutrality regulation tends to weaken the mixed-
ownership model more in case pure-public ownership is the second best alternative and
less when pure-private ownership is the alternative.
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7 Extensions
7.1 Complex compensation
It is sometimes possible to achieve a better outcome with private ownership (i.e. assuming
the manager to decide on quantity) if a more complex compensation model can be used.
If the government could charge the private producers a fixed fee for the right to operate
in the market, it could implement the first best. The voucher price could then be set high
to provide the producers with strong incentives to provide quality and the fixed fee could
be used to recoup all the rents.
In the present model, the government could achieve the first best also without fixed
fees, in case all users can distinguish between the first-best quality and no quality (i.e.
t ≤ z∗). To see this, assume that both producers are private and that the compensation
schedule is quadratic and given by
T (qi) = (c− b) · [(z∗ − t) + 2 · t · qi] · qi + r · Iqi= 12
where r ≥ 0 and Iqi= 12 is the indicator function. Notice that T (qi) ≥ 0 for all qi since
z∗ ≥ t. Then, all z1 = z2 ≥ z∗ − rc−b are Nash equilibria.26 Moreover, since all equilibria
give rise to the same utility r for the managers, they are all coalition-proof. Thus, by
coordinating expectations on z1 = z2 = z∗ the government implements the first best.
However, as fixed fees (and quadratic terms) are rare in reality, I disregard them in
the main part of the paper. A possible reason for this is that the government does not
know the producers’ costs (for more on this, see Wolinsky, 1997). Paying a high fixed
fee would also aggravate uncertainty in the market, e.g. if the producers are not fully
informed about the demand for their services.
7.2 Regulation of inputs
It is sometimes argued that the government should impose minimum requirements on
the use of certain inputs that can be measured and that are believed to be associated
with high quality. Examples in the school sector include the number of qualified teachers
per pupil and various facilities such as libraries and gyms. An alternative is that the
government would provide also private schools with e.g. gyms. The question is if such
26The manager’s utility is given by ui (qi) = T (qi)− (c− b) · zi · qi, or, since qi = 12 + zi−zj2·t , ui (qi) =
(c− b) · (z∗ − zj) · qi + r · Iqi= 12 . Next, I derive firm i’s best reply function. If zj = z∗, then it is a unique
best reply for i to set zi = zj = z∗, implying qi = 12 , giving utility r. All other quantities yield utility
zero. If zj > z∗, then i either sets zi = 0 implying qi = 0 (since zj > z∗ > t) and thus ui = 0 or
zi = zj implying qi = 12 and thus ui = r. If zj < z
∗, then i either induces qi = 1 (requiring zi = t+ zj)
yielding ui = (c− b) · (z∗ − zj) or qi = 12 (requiring zi = zj) yielding ui = r. The previous choice is
better iff zj ≤ z∗ − rc−b . Finally, plotting the best reply functions reveals that z1 = z2 ≥ z∗ − rc−b are
Nash equilibria.
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regulation of inputs could improve the provision of non-contractible quality?
To study this issue I assume that non-contractible quality requires both managerial
effort and the use of a specialized input. By “specialized” I mean that it can not be used
instead of other resources in the production of contractible quality. In particular, consider
a Leontief technology for the production of quality adjusted output, zi · qi. A producer
must use one unit of the (observable) specialized input and e units of (unobservable)
managerial effort for every unit of zi · qi. The price of the specialized input is r and the
price of managerial effort is one. Cost minimization then requires that the producer uses
in total e · zi · qi units of managerial effort and zi · qi units of the specialized input. The
total cost is thus (e+ r) · zi · qi. Therefore, by defining c = e + r, the analysis above is
still valid for the case with no input regulation.
Assume now that the government regulates the use of the specialized input, by requir-
ing κi ≥ κ per unit of output, qi. Notice that such an input regulation does not entail
a precise regulation of quality since the producer may well provide a smaller amount of
non-contractible quality zi < κi and simply dispose of the superfluous specialized inputs.
In fact, it is easy to see that input regulation does not affect the outcome in the case of
pure public ownership assuming that e > b.
In contrast, an input regulation can be used to increase private producers’ incentives
to provide quality. Here I will assume that the government simply acquires the resource,
say gym facilities, and provides it to the producers free of charge (in-kind provision).
But an alternative would be to require the producers to acquire a certain amount of the
resource, say qualified teachers, themselves and to compensate the producers for their
expenses by use of a fixed transfer.
Proposition 6. Assume that the government can provide private producers with special-
ized resources in-kind or regulate the use of such resources. Then, the government will
do so, but it will optimally induce the same non-contractible quality as otherwise. The
welfare gain is that the government can reduce the voucher price and the total voucher
cost by more than the additional cost of acquiring the specialized resources. The reduction
in public expenditure is given by r · t > 0.
The intuition for this result comes from the fact that the rents paid to private producers
are increasing in the producers’ cost of providing non-contractible quality. A similar
argument would show that also the outcome under mixed ownership could be improved
by regulating the inputs used by private producers. Doing so would make mixed ownership
even more attractive relative to pure public ownership, which may be crucial in case of a
binding competitive neutrality regulation.
Measuring input may be a good option if quality cannot be measured and if it is
known that a certain high quality input leads to higher quality. Then, publicizing the
input measures may be used by users as a signal of quality and help them to choose
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their preferred service provider, thereby increasing quality competition. The point here is
different. Measuring input is not a signal of quality, but a way to change the firms’ cost
functions. The gain is not to increase equilibrium quality, but to reduce the rents payed
to induce a given amount of quality.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the relative merits of public and private ownership, including the
possibility to mix the two ownership models, in sectors characterized by both incomplete
contracting problems and (limited) competition. As far as I know, it is the first paper to
do so. There are, however, several important issues that I have not been able to deal with
here.
One of the main results of the present model is that government subsidies to public
firm may sometimes be warranted and that competitive neutrality rules therefore may
conflict with the optimal regulation of mixed markets. Only the negative effects of com-
petitive neutrality are visible. It seems reasonable, however, that a government covering
systematic deficits in its own firms may create various incentive problems that are associ-
ated with weak budget constraints. Such problems have not been addressed in the current
paper. To study these issues, some restrictive assumptions must be replaced. Examples
include the assumption that the government has complete information about the param-
eters of the cost function or that the managers do not need to invest efforts to keep costs
low. In such a more general model, both the pros and the cons of competitive neutrality
regulation could be studied at the same time, allowing also for an analysis of how these
effects could be balanced against one another.
In the present model, public ownership is associated with a higher level of inequality
than private ownership. Under pure public ownership, the government can only induce
positive levels of non-verifiable quality by accepting that one producer offers higher quality
than the other. This result is probably, however, due to the restrictive assumptions of
the model, e.g. that the two producers are identical. Identical producers offer the same
qualities in equilibrium under pure private ownership. If, however, one producer has
a lower cost of providing quality or a stronger intrinsic motivation to do so, the two
producers would offer different qualities under pure private ownership. In contrast, under
pure public ownership, the government could use its right to decide on quantities to
reduce the difference in non-verifiable quality, simply by requiring the disadvantaged firm
to produce a larger quantity. Then, it may be conjectured, governments would be more
inclined to select pure public ownership over pure private ownership, the more inequality
averse they are.27
27Another possibility to reduce inequality would be to require producers offering low non-verifiable
quality in equilibrium to offer higher levels of verifiable qualities.
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The model studied here is meant to focus on some common themes associated with
most welfare sectors, while abstracting from the many idiosyncratic complications asso-
ciated with individual welfare sectors. One example is the presence of network effects
(a.k.a. peer effects) in schooling. But there are also common themes that have been left
out. An example is that governments and users may differ in their valuations of qualities,
which may result in over-treatment in the health sector and grade inflation in the school
system.
Another limitation is that the present paper is only focusing on public ownership and
private for-profit firms, leaving out not-for-profit firms which are relatively common in
the welfare sectors.
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A First best
To prove Lemma 2, recall that social welfare absent inequality aversion (α = 0) is given
by W =
∑
i v · zi · qi −
[
E + λ
2
· E2] where the government’s expenditures are given by
E =
∑
i (c− b) · zi · qi. Thus, we can write W = (v + b− c) · Z − λ2 · (c− b)2 · Z2 where
Z =
∑
i zi · qi. Notice that ∂W∂Z = (v + b− c) − λ · (c− b)2 · Z is strictly positive at
Z = 0 and that ∂2W
∂Z2
= −λ · (c− b)2 < 0. Solving the first order condition implies
that Z∗ = v+b−c
λ·(c−b)2 > 0. This optimum is achieved for any combination of qualities
and quantities such that
∑
i zi · qi = Z∗. To minimize inequity, it is sufficient to set
z1 = z2 = Z
∗. Expressed differently, z1 = z2 = v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 .
B Public ownership
B.1 Quality competition
The full Nash equilibrium structure is:
Lemma 9. Assume that both producers are publicly owned. For (w1, w2) sufficiently high:
• if q
1
+ q
2
< 1 and q
i
< 1
2
, the unique Nash equilibrium prescribes z1 = z2 = 0, and
• if q
1
+ q
2
< 1 and q
2
> 1
2
> q
1
, the unique Nash equilibrium prescribes z1 = 0 and
z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
< t,
• if q
1
+ q
2
= 1, any (z1, z2) with z1 ≥ 0 and z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+ z1 is a Nash
equilibrium.
To prove Lemma 9, I will first assume that (w1, w2) are sufficiently high for Zβi (zj) =
Zi (zj) and then derive the necessary conditions for this to be the case.
First, consider the case when q
1
+ q
2
< 1 and q
i
< 1
2
, displayed in figure 6a. Then,
Figure 5: Quality competition under public ownership
z2
z1
- 2·t·(q1 - ½)
zβ1
zβ2
- 2·t·(q2 - ½)
(a) q
1
+ q
2
< 1 and q
i
< 12
z2
z1
- 2·t·(q1 - ½)
zβ1zβ2
2·t·(q2 - ½)
(b) q
1
+ q
2
< 1 and q
1
> 12 > q2
z2
z1
- 2·t·(q1 - ½)
zβ1
zβ2
 2·t·(q2 - ½)
(c) q
1
+ q
2
= 1 and q
1
> 12 > q2
manager 1’s best-reply function requires that z1 = Z1 (z2) < z2 or z1 = 0. Similarly,
manager 2’s best-reply requires that z2 = Z2 (z1) < z1 or z2 = 0. Both conditions are
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fulfilled only when both qualities are equal to zero. In this case, w1 = w2 = 0 are
sufficiently high.
Second, consider the case when q
1
+ q
2
< 1 and q
2
> 1
2
> q
1
. Then 0 <
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
<
−
(
q
1
− 1
2
)
. This equilibrium is displayed in figure 6b. Clearly, z1 = 0 and z2 = 2 ·
t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
, implying that z2 is increasing in q2 < 1 − q1. In this case, w1 = 0 and
w2 = (c− b) · 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
· q
2
are sufficiently high.
Third, consider the case when q
1
+ q
2
= 1 and q
2
≥ 1
2
. This equilibrium is displayed in
figure 6c. The two best-reply functions lie on top of each other along the part with positive
slope. In case of the coalition proof equilibrium, w1 = 0 and w2 = (c− b)·2·t·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
·q
2
are sufficiently high.
B.2 Social welfare
To prove Lemma 5, I will first rewrite the social welfare function. Since z1 = 0, w1 = 0
is sufficient. Total public expenditure is E = w2 = (c− b) · z2 · q2. Inequality aversion is
given by α · I = α · z2 · q2. Thus W = (v + b− c) · z2 · q2− λ2 · (c− b)
2 ·
[
z2 · q2
]2
−α · z2 · q2.
Moreover, in equilibrium z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
. Thus:
W = (v + b− c− α) · Z − λ
2
· (c− b)2 · Z2
where Z = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
· q
2
∈ [0, t] is strictly increasing in q
2
∈ [1
2
, 1
]
. Notice that W
is strictly concave in Z and that
∂W
∂Z
= (v + b− c− α)− λ · (c− b)2 · Z
is strictly positive at Z = 0 if, and only if v + b − c > α. In this case, the optimum is
characterized by
Z∗ = min
{
v + b− c− α
λ · (c− b)2 , t
}
> 0,
and otherwise Z∗ = 0. The following conclusions are immediate:28
If α ≥ v + b− c, the government sets q
2
= 1
2
and obtains
WG = W 1 = 0.
If α < v+b−c and t ≤ v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 , Z
∗ = t and 1 = 2 ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
·q
2
. Thus, the government
28That is, the production plan must be set to satisfy
(
q
2
− 12
)
· q
2
= 1−k−α2·t·λ·k2 . Notice that for q2 = 1 it
is required that 1−k−α2·t·λ·k2 ≥ 12 that is t ≤ (1− k − α) /λ · k2.
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sets q
2
= 1 and obtains
WG = W 3 =
[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t
]
· t > 0.
If α < v + b− c and t > v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 , Z
∗ < t. Thus, the government sets q
2
∈ (1
2
, 1
)
and
obtains
WG = W 5 =
1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c− α
c− b
]2
> 0.
In particular, since v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
· q
2
it follows that
q
2
=
1
4
+
√
1
16
+
v + b− c− α
2 · t · λ · (c− b)2
where the positive root is selected since q
2
> 1
2
.
In sum, the welfare function is continuous and given by:
WG =

0 α ≥ αG,
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
> 0, α < αG, t > tG,[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t] · t > 0, α < αG, t ≤ tG.
where tG = v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 and α
G = v + b− c.
B.3 Welfare increasing in t
To prove Corollary 2 note that if α < v + b− c:
∂WG
∂t
=
{
0 t > v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2
(v + b− c− α)− λ · (c− b)2 · t > 0 t < v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2
If α ≥ v + b− c welfare does not depend on t.
C Private ownership
The profit of producer i is given by pii = (p− (c− b) · zi) ·
(
1
2
+
zi−zj
2·t
)
. Thus:
∂pii
∂zi
· 2 · t = p− 2 · (c− b) · zi − (c− b) · (t− zj)
and
∂2pii
(∂zi)
2 · 2 · t = −2 · (c− b) < 0.
Clearly, if p = 0, a private producer sets zi = 0. If p > 0, the firm’s first order condition
is given by − (c− b) · (1
2
+
zi−zj
2·t
)
+ (p− (c− b) · zi) · 12·t = 0 and its best-reply function is
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zi = max
{
p−t·(c−b)
2·(c−b) +
1
2
· zj, 0
}
.
If p ≥ t · (c− b), there exists a unique equilibrium with
z =
p− t · (c− b)
c− b
If p < t · (c− b), there exists a unique equilibrium with z1 = z2 = 0.
C.1 Social welfare
To prove Lemma 7, recall that both producers receive the same price and produce the
same quality. Thus, the users’ benefits are given by v · max{ p
c−b − t, 0
}
, there is no
inequality, and the total public expenditure is E =
∑
i p · qi = p. Thus social welfare is
given by W = v ·max{ p
c−b − t, 0
}− p− λ
2
· p2. . Since any p ∈ (0, t · (c− b)) leads to zero
quality, the government prefers p = 0 to any such price. For p ≥ t · (c− b),
W =
v + b− c
c− b · p−
λ
2
· p2 − v · t
which is strictly concave in price. The first derivative
∂W
∂p
=
v + b− c
c− b − λ · p
is strictly positive at p = t · (c− b) if and only if t < v+b−c
λ·(c−b)2 . The interior solution
p = v+b−c
λ·(c−b) > t · (c− b) > 0 yields zinterior = v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 − t = z∗ − t and W interior =
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c
c−b
]2 − v · t = W ∗ − v · t > 0. The corner solution p = 0 implies zcorner = 0 and
W corner = 0. The interior solution is strictly preferred if and only if t < v+b−c
2·v · v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 .
C.2 Input regulation
To prove Proposition 6, note that a private firm’s profit is given by
pii = (p− (e− b) · zi − r · κi) ·
(
1
2
+
zi − zj
2 · t
)
,
where zi ≤ κi. Absent regulation producers set κi = zi and in symmetric equilibrium
z′ =
p
e+ r − b − t,
which is the same as before since e+ r = c. Recall that the optimal voucher price is given
by
p′ =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b) .
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Assume now that the government imposes a minimum requirement κ to be defined
below. Then, the first derivative is given by
∂pii
∂zi
· 2 · t = p− (c− b) · (t+ 2 · zi − zj)
for zi < κ. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is given by
z∗ =
p
e− b − t
if the government sets κ = z∗ or larger. Consider now the government’s choice of voucher
price. Since both producers produce the same quality and receive the same price, the users’
benefits are given by v · [ p
e−b − t
]
, there is no inequality, and the total public expenditure
is E =
∑
i p · qi + r ·
[
p
e−b − t
]
= p + r · [ p
e−b − t
]
. Recall that e = c − r, it is straight
forward to verify that the optimal voucher price is given by
p∗ =
[
1− r
c− b
]
· v + b− c
λ · (c− b) < p
′.
The equilibrium quality is given by
z∗ =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 − t
which, however, is the same as absent regulation. Since the benefits are the same, with
and without input regulation, we only need to compare the government’s expenditures.
With input regulation expenditures are given by E∗ = p∗+r ·z∗ and without expenditures
are given by E ′ = p′. Substituting, reveals that he difference in expenditures as a result
of input regulation is negative
4E = p∗ + r · z∗ − p′ = −r · t < 0.
D Public vs private ownership
Recall that Proposition 1 is conveniently summarized in figure 2. To prove the proposition,
I first rewrite it as the following Lemma:
Lemma 10. If α ≥ αG, WG (t) 5 W P (t) for t ≤ tP (v, c− b) = v+b−c
2·v · v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 , with
∂tP (v,c−b)
∂(c−b) < 0 and
∂tP (v,c−b)
∂v
> 0. If α < αG, there exists a t◦ (α, v, c− b) > 0 such that
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WG
(
t
◦) S W P (t◦) for t S t◦. The threshold is given by
t
◦
(α, v, c− b) =

(v+b−c)+(v−α)−
√
(v−α)·[(2·(v+b−c)+(v−α))]
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≤ α′,
α
v
· (v+b−c)−
1
2
·α
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≥ α′,
where
α′ = (v + b− c)−
[√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
]
∈ (0, v + b− c) .
The threshold t◦ (α, v, c− b) is continuous in α. Moreover
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂α
> 0
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂ (c− b) < 0
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂v
> 0.
To prove this Lemma, recall that welfare under public ownership is given by
WG (α, t) =

0 α ≥ αG,[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t] · t > 0, α < αG, t ≤ tG,
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
> 0, α < αG, t > tG.
where tG = v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 and α
G = v + b− c, and, under private ownership, by
W P (t) =
{
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c
c−b
]2 − v · t t ≤ tP
0 otherwise
where tP = v+b−c
2·v · v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 < v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 , where the inequality follows from b− c < v.
First, it is immediately clear that:
Claim 1. If α ≥ αG, WG (t) 5 W P (t) for t ≤ tP ,
and that
Claim 2. If t ≥ tP , WG (t) = W P (t) for α ≤ αG.
Second, I show that:
Claim 3. If α < αG, there exists a t◦ > 0 such that WG
(
t
◦) S W P (t◦) for t S t◦ .
To see this, first note that welfare is higher under private ownership if users are very
mobile, WG (0) = 0 < W P (0). However, under public ownership, welfare is increasing in
user immobility,WGt (0) > 0 andWGt (t) ≥ 0 for all t. In contrast, welfare is falling in user
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immobility under private ownership, W Pt (0) < 0, W Pt (t) ≤ 0 for all t and W P (t) = 0 for
t large enough.
Third, I show that:
Claim 4. Assume that α < αG. The threshold is given by
t
◦
(α, v, c− b) =

(v+b−c)+(v−α)−
√
(v−α)·[(2·(v+b−c)+(v−α))]
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≤ α′,
α
v
· (v+b−c)−
1
2
·α
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≥ α′,
To prove this claim I need to solve WG
(
t
◦)
= 1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c
c−b
]2 − v · t◦ to find t◦ . Thus, I
need to consider two cases correspond to the two pieces of WG (t). Also notice that these
two pieces meet at the point (t,W ) =
(
v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 ,
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2).
First, consider the case when[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t◦
]
· t◦ = 1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c
c− b
]2
− v · t◦
or [
(2v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t◦
]
· t◦ = 1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c
c− b
]2
Note that the right hand side is strictly positive. The left hand side (LHS) is zero
at t = 0 but increasing in t since 2v + b− c− α > 0. The LHS is maximized over t
at
t =
2v + b− c− α
λ · (c− b)2
giving
LHS =
1
2 · λ ·
(
(v + b− c) + (v − α)
c− b
)2
Thus, there exists a t solving the equation if α ≤ v. Rewriting the equation as,[
t−
(
2v + b− c− α
λ · (c− b)2
)]2
=
1
λ · (c− b)2 ·
1
λ · (c− b)2 · (v − α) · [(3v + 2 (b− c)− α)]
and solving it gives
t
◦
=
(v + b− c− α) + v −√(v − α) · [(3v + 2 (b− c)− α)]
λ · (c− b)2 .
Notice that I have selected the lower root, which corresponds to the relevant (in-
creasing) part of WG
(
t
◦). This, solution is valid only if it occurs below the meeting
point of the two parts of WG
(
t
◦) which occurs at v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 . Thus it is necessary
that
v ≤
√
(v − α) · [(3v + 2 (b− c)− α)]
34
i.e.
v2 ≤ (v − α) · [(3v + 2 (b− c)− α)]
i.e.
(2v + (b− c))2 − 2v · (v + (b− c)) ≤ [(2v + (b− c))− α]2
α ≤ (2v + (b− c))−
√
v2 + (v + (b− c))2.
Notice that I have chosen the lower root since α− v < 0. Thus, it is necessary that
α ≤ α′, where
α′ = (v + b− c)−
[√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
]
∈ (0, v + b− c) .
The two inequalities follow from the fact that v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 > v2 and v2 +
[v − (c− b)]2 < (v + (v + b− c))2.
Second, consider the case when
1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c− α
c− b
]2
=
1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c
c− b
]2
− v · t◦
t
◦
=
α
v
· (v + b− c)−
1
2
· α
λ · (c− b)2
This, solution is valid only if it occurs above the meeting point of the two parts of
WG
(
t
◦) which occurs at v+b−c−α
λ·(c−b)2 . Thus it is necessary that
α
v
· v + b− c−
1
2
α
λ · (c− b)2 ≥
v + b− c− α
λ · (c− b)2
i.e.
α
v
(
v + b− c− 1
2
α
) ≥ v + b− c− α
This inequality is fulfilled if α ≥ v. But it could also be fulfilled when α < v.
Consider this case. Then the inequality an be written as
α ≥ [2v + (b− c)]−
√
v2 + [v + (b− c)]2 = α′.
Notice that I have chosen the negative root since α < v + b − c. Thus, it is re-
quired that α ≥ v or α ≥ α′. Finally, notice that α′ < v since (v + b− c) −[√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
]
< v which reduces to 0 < v2.
Next:
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Claim 5. Assume that α < αG. The threshold t◦ (α, v, c− b) is continuous in α. Moreover
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂α
> 0
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂ (c− b) < 0
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂v
> 0.
.
First, recall that
t
◦
(α, v, c− b) =

(v+b−c)+(v−α)−
√
(v−α)·[(2·(v+b−c)+(v−α))]
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≤ α′,
α
v
· (v+b−c)−
1
2
·α
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≥ α′,
where
α′ = (v + b− c)−
[√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
]
∈ (0, v + b− c) .
Second, notice that t◦ is continuous in α. When α ≤ α′:
t
◦
(α, v, c− b) = (v + b− c) + (v − α)−
√
(v − α) · [(2 · (v + b− c) + (v − α))]
λ · (c− b)2
then:
t
◦
(α′, v, c− b) =
√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
λ · (c− b)2 .
When α ≥ α′:
t
◦
(α, v, c− b) = α
v
· (v + b− c)−
1
2
· α
λ · (c− b)2
then:
t
◦
(α′, v, c− b) =
√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
λ · (c− b)2
Third, notice that
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂α
·λ·(c− b)2 =
 −1 + 12 ·
[
2·(v+b−c)+(v−α)
(v−α)
] 1
2
+ 1
2
·
[
(v−α)
2·(v+b−c)+(v−α)
] 1
2
> 0, α ≤ α′,
1
v
· [(v + b− c)− α] > 0, α ≥ α′,
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since for any a and b
−1 + 1
2
·
(a
b
) 1
2
+
1
2
·
(
b
a
) 1
2
> 0
(a+ b)2 > 4a · b
(a− b)2 > 0.
Fourth, Recall that
t
◦
(α, v, c− b) =

[v−(c−b)]+(v−α)−
√
(v−α)·[(2·[v−(c−b)]+(v−α))]
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≤ α′,
α
v
· [v−(c−b)]−
1
2
·α
λ·(c−b)2 , α ≥ α′,
Thus
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂ (c− b) < 0
for α ≥ α′. Moreover, this is also true for α ≤ α′. To see this, note that the
nominator is decreasing in c− b since
−1 +
[
(v − α)
2 · [v − (c− b)] + (v − α)
] 1
2
< 0
since
0 < [v − (c− b)] .
Fifth,
∂t
◦
(α, v, c− b)
∂v
·λ·(c− b)2 =
 2− 12 ·
[
2·[v−(c−b)]+(v−α)
(v−α)
] 1
2 − 3
2
(
v−α
2·[v−(c−b)]+(v−α)
) 1
2
> 0, α ≤ α′,
α
v2
· [(c− b) + 1
2
· α] > 0, α ≥ α′,
since
2− 1
2
·
[
a+ b
b
] 1
2
− 3
2
(
b
a+ b
) 1
2
> 0
8 · b > a
8 · (v − α) > 2 · [v − (c− b)]
α <
3
4
· v + 1
4
· (c− b)
recalling that α < α′ = (v + b− c)−
[√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
]
and noting
α′ = (v + b− c)−
[√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 − v
]
<
3
4
· v + 1
4
· (c− b)
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since
5v − 5 (c− b)− 4
√
v2 + [v − (c− b)]2 < 0.
Finally I consider the case when α ≥ αG. Then, WG (t◦) 5 W P (t) for t ≤ t′ (v, c− b) =
v+b−c
2·v · v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 . Notice that
∂t′(v,c−b)
∂v
= 2·v
2·v2 · (v+b−c)λ·(c−b)2 − 12·v2 ·
(v+b−c)2
λ·(c−b)2 =
1
2·v2 · (v+b−c)λ·(c−b)2 ·
[v + (c− b)] > 0. Also ∂t′(v,c−b)
∂(c−b) = − 22·v · (v+b−c)λ·(c−b)2 − 22·v ·
(v+b−c)2
λ·(c−b)3 < 0.
E Mixed ownership
E.1 Quality competition
Lemma 11. Given p and q
2
, there is a unique equilibrium (z1, z2) in the quality com-
petition game, assuming that w2 ≥ (c− b) · z2 · q2. If the government sets p ≥ 2 · t ·
(c− b)
(
1− q
2
)
≥ 0, the public firm’s equilibrium quality is given by z2 = 4 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+
p−t·(c−b)
(c−b) and the private firm’s quality is given by z1 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+ p−t·(c−b)
(c−b) . If the
government sets p < 2 · t · (c− b)
(
1− q
2
)
, the equilibrium qualities are given by z1 = 0
and z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
.
To prove Lemma 11, notice that the public producer has the same best reply function,
independent of how the competitor is owned. In particular, it is given by
z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+ z1,
where q
2
≥ 1
2
is the production plan, assuming that the manager’s wage covers his effort
cost. The private firm’s best reply function is the same, independent of how the competitor
is owned. In particular, it is given by
z1 = max
{
p− t · (c− b)
2 · (c− b) +
1
2
· z2, 0
}
whenever p > 0 and zero otherwise. Assuming z1 > 0, the equilibrium is defined by a
system of two linear equations. The solution is
z2 = 4 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+
p− t · (c− b)
(c− b) , (2)
and
z1 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+
p− t · (c− b)
(c− b) . (3)
Notice that z1 ≥ 0, if and only if:
p ≥ 2 · t · (c− b)
(
1− q
2
)
≥ 0. (4)
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Otherwise, the equilibrium must entail z1 = 0 and thus z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
.
Whether or not (the price and) the wage will be set high enough for this solution to
be implemented is for the government to decide.
E.2 Government policy
To prove Proposition 2, I first rewrite it as the following Lemma:
Lemma 12. Consider the case of mixed ownership. There exists a continuous function
t∗ (α) such that the government sets:
i. p > 0 and q
2
= 1
2
if t ≤ t∗ (α) and α ≥ 2 · v
ii. p > 0 and q
2
= 1− 3
4
· α
v+α
if t ≤ t∗ (α) and α ∈ (0, 2 · v)
iii. p > 0 and q
2
= 1 if t < t∗ (α) and α = 0
iv. p = 0 and q
2
= 1
2
if t > t∗ (α) and α ≥ v + b− c
v. p = 0 and q
2
∈ (1
2
, 1
)
if t ≥ t∗ (α) and α < v + b− c.
The corresponding levels of welfare are given by:
i. W = 1
2·λ ·
(
v+b−c
c−b
)2 − 1
2
· v · t
ii. W = 1
2·λ ·
(
v+b−c
c−b
)2 − α · t · (1− 9
8
· α
v+α
)
iii. W = 1
2·λ ·
(
v+b−c
c−b
)2 − α · t
iv. W = 0
v. W = 1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
This different regions are also illustrated by figure 6.
Figure 6: Optimal regulation under mixed ownership
t
α
v+b-c
2v
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
i.
ii.
iv.
v.
iii.
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E.2.1 Case 1: Corner solutions (z1 = 0)
To prove Lemma 12, recall that producer 2 is the public producer. The government sets p
and q
2
to maximize social welfare, W = B−(E + λ
2
· E2)−α ·I. The government’s choice
set is described by figure 7. I will first consider the case when condition 4 is violated and
Figure 7: Government’s choice set
q2
p
12__1
2 t (c-b)
"Interior solutions"
z1 ≥ 0
z1 = 0
the government implements z1 = 0. I will refer to this as the “corner solution” and the
case when condition 4 is not binding as the “interior solution.”
When condition 4 is violated, the equilibrium qualities are given by z1 = 0 and z2 =
2·t·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
. Since the private producer is not meant to provide any non-verifiable quality,
the government sets p = 0. The analysis of the government’s choice of the production
plan is perfectly analogous to the analysis in the case when both producers are public.
Thus:
W =

W 1 = 0 α ≥ αG,
W 5 = 1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
> 0, α < αG, t > tG,
W 3 =
[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t] · t > 0, α < αG, t ≤ tG.
where tG = (v+b−c)−α
λ·(c−b)2 and α
G = v + b− c. The solutions are described in figure 8.
E.2.2 Case 2: Interior solutions (z1 ≥ 0)
Recall that (by 4) if p ≥ 2 · t · (c− b)
(
1− q
2
)
, the two equilibrium quantities are given
by equation 3 and 2. Then, the social benefits are given by
B = v ·
∑
i
zi · qi = v ·
[
2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+
p
(c− b) − t
]
+ v · 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
· q
2
,
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Figure 8: Corner solution
t
α
v+b-c
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
q2 = ½
q2 = 1
q2 ∈ (½, 1)
W1
W3
W5
p = 0
p = 0
p = 0
the public expenditures by
E = p · q1 + (c− b) · z2 · q2 = p+ 4 · t · (c− b) ·
(
q
2
− 3
4
)
· q2,
and the inequality by
I = (z2 − z1) · q2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
· q
2
.
The first derivatives of the profit function are given by
∂W
∂p
=
v + b− c
c− b − λ · E,
and
∂W
∂q
2
= v · 4 · t ·
(
q
2
+
1
4
)
− [1 + λ · E] · 8 · t · (c− b) ·
(
q
2
− 3
8
)
− α · 4 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
4
)
.
The second derivatives are given by
∂2W
∂p2
= −λ < 0,
and
∂2W
∂p∂q
2
= −λ · 8 · t · (c− b) ·
(
q
2
− 3
8
)
< 0,
and
∂2W
∂q2
2
= (v − α) · 4 · t− [1 + λ · E] · 8 · t · (c− b)− λ ·
[
8 · t · (c− b) ·
(
q
2
− 3
8
)]2
,
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and
42 = ∂2W
∂p2
· ∂2W
∂q2
2
− ( ∂2W
∂p∂q
2
)2 = −λ · [(v − α) · 4 · t− [1 + λ · E] · 8 · t · (c− b)] .
Assuming the price to be determined by the first-order condition, we have
p =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b) − 4 · t · (c− b) ·
(
q
2
− 3
4
)
· q
2
,
and
E =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b) .
Then
∂W
∂q
2
= 4 · (v + α) · t ·
([
1− 3
4
α
v + α
]
− q
2
)
,
and
∂2W
∂q2
2
= − (α + v) · 4 · t− λ ·
[
8 · t · (c− b) ·
(
q
2
− 3
8
)]2
< 0
and
42 = λ · (α + v) · 4 · t > 0.
Thus, any solution to the two first-order conditions is a local maximum.
Moreover, notice that
∂W
(
1
2
)
∂q
2
= t · (2 · v − α) ,
and
∂W (1)
∂q
2
= −t · 3 · α,
which means that I need to consider three different cases (including two “corner solutions”)
regarding the public firm’s production plan.
First, if α ∈ (0, 2 · v), the first-order condition for an interior solution gives
q
2
= 1− 3
4
· α
v + α
∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
.
Recall that condition 4 is fulfilled if p ≥ 2 · t · (c− b)
(
1− q
2
)
, or
v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 ≥ t ·
[
1− 9
4
· α · v
(v + α)2
]
and since the expression in square brackets is positive, it is required that
t ≤ tz = v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 ·
[
1− 9
4
· v · α
(v + α)2
]−1
.
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If this condition is satisfied, p > 0 and social welfare is equal to
W 4 =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− α · t ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)
.
Second, if α ≥ 2 · v, ∂W(
1
2)
∂q
2
≤ 0 and the government sets q
2
= 1
2
. Then:
p =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b) + t · (c− b) ·
1
2
,
and condition 4 is fulfilled if
t ≤ tza = 2 · v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 .
If this condition is satisfied, p > 0 and social welfare is equal to
W 2 =
1
2 · λ
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− 1
2
· v · t.
Third, if α = 0, ∂W (1)
∂q
2
≥ 0 and the government sets q
2
= 1. Then
p =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b) − t · (c− b) ,
and condition 4 is fulfilled if
t ≤ tzb = v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 .
Notice that tzb ≤ tz. If this condition is satisfied, p ≥ 0 (with strict inequality as long as
t < tzb) and social welfare is equal to
W 6 =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− (α · t) .
Thinking of tz as a function of α, it may be noted that tz (0) = v+b−c
λ·(c−b)2 = t
zb and
tz (2 · v) = v+b−c
λ·(c−b)2 · 2 = tza . The equilibrium structure is displayed in figure 9, where the
curved line is tz (α).
E.2.3 Comparison of solutions
For large t, there does not exist any interior solution. Then the corner solution is chosen.
For lower t, when both solutions exist, I need to compare the “interior solution” satisfying
condition 4 and the “corner solution” with z1 = 0. The reason is that the interior solutions
may give rise to z1 ≈ 0 despite p >> 0. Then, it may be better to set p = 0 entailing
z1 = 0. The relevant comparisons are displayed in figure 10.
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Figure 9: Interior solution
t
α
v+b-c
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
q2 = ½
q2 = 1
q2 ∈ (½, 1)
W2
W6
W4
p > 0
p ≥ 0
p > 0
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
2v
Figure 10: Comparisons
t
α
v+b-c
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
W2 or W1
W6 or W3
W4 or W1
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
2v
W1
W5W4 or W5
W4 or W3
First, consider the case when α ≥ 2 · v. Notice that W 2 ≥ W 1 if and only if
1
2 · λ
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− 1
2
· v · t ≥ 0
i.e.
t ≤ t∗ (α) = 1
v · λ
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
.
Note that
t∗ (α) =
(
v + b− c
v
)
· v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 < 2 ·
v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 = t
za,
since b− c < v. That is, this condition is more strict, than the condition for W 2 to
be valid.
Second, consider the case when α ∈ [v + b− c, 2 · v]. Notice that W 4 ≥ W 1 if and only
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if
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− α · t ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)
≥ 0
i.e.
t ≤ t∗ (α) = 1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
·
[
α ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)]−1
.
Note that t∗ (α) ≤ tz when α ∈ [v + b− c, 2 · v] since
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
·
[
α ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)]−1
≤ v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 ·
[
1− 9
4
· v · α
(v + α)2
]−1
or
(v + b− c) · [4 · (v + α)2 − 9 · v · α] ≤ α · (8 · (v + α)2 − 9 · α (v + α)) .
This inequality follows from the fact that α ≥ v + b − c in the relevant region and
that
4 · (v + α)2 − 9 · v · α ≤ 8 · (v + α)2 − 9 · α (v + α)
i.e. α ≤ 2 · v which is true in the relevant region.
Third, consider the case when α ≤ v + b− c. Notice that W 4 ≥ W 5 if and only if
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− α · t ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)
≥ 1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c− α
c− b
]2
i.e.
t ≤ t∗ (α) = 1
λ
· (v + b− c)−
1
2
· α
(c− b)2 ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)−1
.
Recall that W 4 is valid if
tz =
v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 ·
[
1− 9
4
· v · α
(v + α)2
]−1
1
λ
· (v + b− c)−
1
2
· α
(c− b)2 ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)−1
≤ v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 ·
[
1− 9
4
· v · α
(v + α)2
]−1
i.e.[
(v + b− c)− 1
2
· α
]
·
[
1− 9
8
· α
(v + α)
· 2 · v
(v + α)
]
≤ [v + b− c] ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)
which is true, comparing factor by factor, as long as α > 0.
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Fourth, consider the case when α ≤ v + b− c. Notice that W 4 ≥ W 3 if and only if
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
−α · t ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v + α
)
≥
[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t
]
· t
i.e.
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
≥
[
(v + b− c)− 9
8
· α
2
v + α
− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t
]
· t.
This inequality is always fulfilled, since maximum value of the right hand side (max-
imizing over t) is lower than the left and side.
Fifth, consider the case when α = 0. Notice that W 6 ≥ W 3 if and only if
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− (α · t) ≥
[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t
]
· t
i.e.
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
≥
[
(v + b− c)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t
]
· t.
This inequality is always fulfilled, since maximum value of the right hand side (max-
imizing over t) is equal to the left and side.
The solution is summarized by figure 11. The, border between the interior and the corner
Figure 11: Mixed ownership
t
α
v+b-c
2v
q2 ∈ (½, 1)
W4
p > 0
q2 = ½
W2
p > 0
q2 = 1
W6
p ≥ 0
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)22·
v+b-c
λ·(c-b)2
q2 = ½
W1
p = 0
q2 ∈ (½, 1)
W5
p = 0
solution, the t∗ (α)-function, is given by:
t∗ (α) =

1
v·λ ·
(
v+b−c
c−b
)2
α ≥ 2 · v
1
2·α·λ ·
(
v+b−c
c−b
)2 · (1− 9
8
· α
v+α
)−1
α ∈ [v + b− c, 2 · v]
1
λ
· (v+b−c)− 12 ·α
(c−b)2 ·
(
1− 9
8
· α
v+α
)−1
α ≤ v + b− c
It is straight-forward to demonstrate that this function is continuous in α.
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F Comparison of ownership models
To prove Proposition 3, the main argument is that mixed ownership allows the government
to always replicate the outcome of the pure models, but also to do more.
F.1 Mixed vs private ownership
With mixed ownership the government can always implement the same (symmetric) equi-
librium qualities as under private ownership, i.e.
z =

p−t·(c−b)
c−b > 0, p > t · (c− b)
0, p = 0
by setting q
2
= 1
2
. With private ownership, the producers always receive rents whenever
quality is strictly positive (since p = (c− b) · z + t · (c− b)). With mixed ownership,
only the private firm keeps the rents. Thus, under the conditions when the government
sets q
2
= 1
2
and p > 0 under mixed ownership, mixed ownership is preferred. Under the
conditions when the government sets q
2
= 1
2
and p = 0 under mixed ownership, the two
ownership models give exactly the same outcome. Finally, under any conditions when the
government sets q
2
> 1
2
, mixed ownership is preferred (by revealed preference). In sum:
mixed ownership (weakly) dominates private ownership. The government is indifferent
only if α ≥ v + b− c and t > t∗ (α).
F.2 Mixed vs public ownership
With mixed ownership the government can always implement the same outcome as under
public ownership by setting p = 0. Thus, under any condition when the government sets
p > 0, the mixed model yields a strictly better outcome. Thus, mixed ownership (weakly)
dominates public ownership. The government is indifferent only if t > t∗ (α).
F.3 Breach of competitive neutrality
To prove Proposition 4, recall that in equilibrium the public producer offers quality
z2 =
p− t · (c− b)
(c− b) + 4 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
which leads to cost
(c− b) · z2 = p− t · (c− b) + (c− b) · 4 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
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or
(c− b) · z2 = p− 4 · t · (c− b) ·
(
3
4
− q
2
)
.
Thus, the voucher does not cover the public producer’s cost, i.e. p < (c− b) · z2, if
q
2
> 3
4
. (The private producer’s cost is always covered in equilibrium.) Recall the
government’s choice of q
2
reported in Lemma 12. When t < t∗ (α), the government
sets q
2
= 1 − 3
4
· α
v+α
in breach of competitive neutrality if α < v
2
. When t ≥ t∗ (α),
the government sets q
2
= 1
4
+
√
1
16
+ v+b−c−α
2·t·λ·(c−b)2 in breach of competitive neutrality if
α < (v + b− c)− 3
8
· λ · (c− b)2 · t.
G Competitive neutrality
To prove Lemma 8, recall that producer 2 is the public producer. The government sets
p and q
2
to maximize social welfare, W = B − (E + λ
2
· E2) − α · I. The government’s
choice set is described by figure 7.
I will first consider the case when condition 4 is not violated and the government
implements z1 > 0. I will refer to this as the “interior solution” and the case when
condition 4 is not binding as the “corner solution.”
G.1 Case 1: “interior solution” with z1 > 0
Recall that the two best-reply functions are given by
z1 =
p− t · (c− b)
2 · (c− b) +
1
2
· z2,
z2 = 2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
+ z1.
When competitive neutrality is binding the voucher price must be set at p = (c− b) · z2
to ensure that the private producer receives the same conditions as the public producer.
I will use the competitive neutrality restriction to substitute for the government’s choice
variable p. Thus, I will formally allow the government to set z2 instead. It follows
immediately from the private firm’s best-reply function that z1 = z2 − 12 · t as long as
z2 ≥ 12 · t and from the public firm’s best-reply function that the government must set
q
2
= 3
4
.
In equilibrium, the social benefits are given by
B = v · z2 − 1
8
· v · t,
48
and the public expenditures are given by
E = (c− b) · z2,
and the inequality is given by
I = (z2 − z1) · q2 = 3
8
· t.
The government sets z2 to maximize social welfare,
W = (v + b− c) · z2 − λ
2
· (c− b)2 · z22 −
1
8
· [v + 3 · α] · t
The first-order condition is
∂W
∂z2
= (v + b− c)− λ · (c− b)2 · z2 = 0.
Thus z2 = v+b−cλ·(c−b)2 and z1 =
v+b−c
λ·(c−b)2− 12 ·t. This solution is valid, i.e., z1 ≥ 0, if t ≤ 2· v+b−cλ·(c−b)2
. Then:
WCN =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− v + 3 · α
8
· t.
Note that since q
2
= 3
4
, it follows that q
2
∈ [1
2
, 1
]
.
G.2 Case 2: “Corner solution” with z1 = 0
When condition 4 is violated, the equilibrium qualities are given by z1 = 0 and z2 =
2 · t ·
(
q
2
− 1
2
)
. When competitive neutrality is binding the voucher price must be set at
p = (c− b) · z2 to ensure that the private producer receives the same conditions as the
public producer. It is, however, immediately clear that pure public ownership is better
than mixed oligopoly under a binding competitive neutrality constraint, in case there is a
corner solution. The reason is that with a pure public solution, the government does not
need to pay any rents to the firm producing zero non-verifiable quality. I will therefore
not analyze this solution any further.
G.3 Effect of a binding competitive neutrality regulation on the
private producer
Note that the public producer has a lower quantity under competitive neutrality regula-
tion, i.e. 3
4
< 1 − 3
4
· α
v+α
if α < v
2
. Also, the voucher price is lower under competitive
neutrality regulation if
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(c− b) · v + b− c
λ · (c− b)2 >
v + b− c
λ · (c− b) − t · (c− b) ·
1
4
·
(
1− 3 · α
v + α
)
·
(
4− 3 · α
v + α
)
0 <
(
1
3
− α
v + α
)
·
(
4
3
− α
v + α
)
i.e if 1
3
> α
v+α
i.e v
2
> α. Private profit absent competitive neutrality regulation is
pi = (p− (c− b) · z1) · q1
pi = t · (c− b) · 9
8
·
(
α
v + α
)2
Under competitive neutrality regulation it is
pi = (c− b) · 1
8
· t
Thus profit is larger under regulation if 9 · ( α
v+α
)2
< 1 i.e. α < v
2
.
G.4 Choice of ownership
Recall that under mixed ownership and binding competitive neutrality, welfare is given
by
WCN (t) =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− v + 3 · α
8
· t.
Under private ownership welfare is given by
W P =
{
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c
c−b
]2 − v · t > 0 t ≤ v+b−c
2·v · v+b−cλ·(c−b)2
0 otherwise
Thus WCN ≥ W P since v+3·α
8
< v i.e. α < 7
3
· v which is fulfilled when the regulation is
binding.
Also recall that
WG (t) =

0 α ≥ αG,
1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
> 0, α < αG, t > tG,[
(v + b− c− α)− λ
2
· (c− b)2 · t] · t > 0, α < αG, t ≤ tG.
Notice that when α < αG, WG (t) is continuous and increasing from WG (0) = 0 to
WG (t) = 1
2·λ ·
[
v+b−c−α
c−b
]2
> 0 for large t, and that WCN (t) is falling in t. In fact,
WCN (t) =
1
2 · λ ·
(
v + b− c
c− b
)2
− v + 3 · α
8
· t < 1
2 · λ ·
[
v + b− c− α
c− b
]2
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when
t >
8 · α
v + 3 · α ·
(v + b− c)− 1
2
· α
λ · (c− b)2 .
Thus for t large enough, the government prefers pure public ownership to mixed ownership
under competitive neutrality regulation.
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